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The paper analyzes the impact of employee participation in management on bargaining power 
and wages. It presents an empirical model which allows for variable bargaining powers of the 
parties who jointly control the firm and it tests this model with postwar West German data. The 
results suggest that ‘parity codetermination’ has had a positive effect on earnings in iron and 
steel but not in coal mining. Moreover, it appears that the positive effect in iron and steel could 
be due to increased profitability rather than an increase in the bargaining power of labor as 
defined in this study. 
1. Introduction 
Since the early 1970’s there has been a definite trend in many Western 
European countries toward establishing some form of employee participa- 
tion in management and this trend is likely to continue. The main stimulus 
for this on-going change has been the reversal of many trade-unions on this 
issue. Until recently, most Western trade unions (except for the German and 
Austrian unions) were opposed to the idea of participation in management. 
Once they turned in favor of participation, however, they promoted it and 
usually succeeded in having a limited form of employee participation legally 
founded.’ 
* I would like to thank Orley Ashenfelter, Gerald Epstein, Edward Green, Arvind 
Panagariya, Louis Phlips, Albert Rees, Robert Solow and two anonymous referees for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. This research was in part supported by a grant from 
the Council for European Studies and a grant to the Princeton University Economics Depart- 
ment from the Sloan Foundation. 
i Since 1973 two worker representatives have been allowed to sit on each Board of Directors 
in Sweden, and a virtually identical arrangement has existed in Denmark since 1974. In Austria 
and Luxembourg worker representatives have occupied one-third of the seats on the Boards 
since 1974. Similarly, in Norway employees have had since 1973 the option of filling one-third 
of the Board seats with their representatives. In the Netherlands workers have an indirect voice 
in deciding the membership of the Supervisory Board. In Britain the situation is in a state of 
flux. The Iabour Party pushes for participation and the Trade Unions Congress advocates the 
inclusion of union representatives on the Boards on a parity basis with the other members. 
Many trade unions affiliated with the T.U.C., however, still reject this form of participation. As 
recent debates over the Bullock report indicate, the outcome is not clear. Finally, proposals of 
the Commission of the European Economic Community (1970, 1975) for a statute for a 
European Company suggest that the German-type representation (discussed later) may in the 
future be adopted by the entire European Community. For a more detailed discussion of the 
underlying institutional factors and the extent of actual participation, see Schregle (1976) and 
Windmuller (1977). 
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In the debates that have accompanied the establishment of employee 
participation it has often been’ argued that participation will, among other 
things, increase labor’s power relative to that of management Bnd sharehol- 
ders. The question then arises as to whether this might also Jead to an 
increase in labor’s income relative to that of the other two groups. Unfortu- 
nately, theoretical work on the economic impact of worker participation has 
ignored this issue, primarly because of the absence of a theoretical specifica- 
tion with a natural characterization of ‘labor’s power’.* In addition, the 
‘existing empirical material on this subject is primarily institutional with only 
sketchy quantitative analysis.3 
This paper presents an econometric framework for analyzing the effects of 
participation on labor’s bargaining power and wages, and empirical evidence 
based on available data from the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The German experience with employee participation is unique in that it is 
quite extensive and diverse, thus providing testable examples of at least two 
different participatory systems. One was created by the 1951 Codetermina- 
tion Act which granted employees in the coal mining and the iron and steel 
industries fifty percent (parity) representation on the Boards of Directors4 of 
their enterprises. In addition, the Act created the position of a labor director 
on all Management Boards. The labor director, appointed by the Board of 
Directors, is responsible for the Management Board’s labor policies. Be- 
cause he cannot be appointed or dismissed without majority approval of the 
employee representatives to the Board of Directors, he tends to be a 
pro-labor force on the Management Board [see Vollmer (1976) and 
Fiirstenberg (1969, 1977)].’ 
The second system was created by the 1952 Works Constitution Act 
which provided employees in all but the shipping and air-transport indus- 
tries with thirty-three percent representation on the Boards of Directors. 
Thus while employees in iron-steel and coal mining obtained parity rep- 
resentation on the Boards of Directors and control over the labor post on 
the Management Boards, their counterparts in other industries were given 
only thirty-three percent of the seats on the Boards of Directors. This 
distinction is important for two reasons. First, in the German system 
employee representatives to the Boards of Directors take part in the Boards’ 
deliberations and decision-making concerning collective bargaining agree- 
* Steinherr’s (1977) model could conceivably accommodate this aspect but Steinherr does not 
develop the model in this direction. 
’ Studies which attempted to analyze the relationship between participation and labor income 
are those of Blumenthal (1956, pp. 70-89) and Sturmthal (1964, pp. 76-79). They use only a 
loose quantitative approach, however, and provide no formal model for the analysis. 
4 Unlike the single-board Anglo-American system, the German system is based on two 
boards: the Board of Directors (Aufsichtsrat) and the Management Board (Vorstand). 
s Recently, the 1976 Codetermination Act extended a modified version of the 1951 Act to all 
firms in the German economy with a workforce over 2,000 [see Vollmer (1976)]. 
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ments and industrial disputes.6 Secondly, the labor director has considerable 
discretion over the wage determination process at the firm level. While it is 
true that wage rates are usually set in an industry-wide agreement between 
the trade union and the employer association, the actual wage may consider- 
ably exceed the rates set in the master agreement at the industry level.’ 
It should also be noted that within the 1951 Codetermination Act an 
important distinction exists between the roles of the labor directors in the 
iron-steel and coal mining industries. While the labor directors of the iron 
and steel companies are appointed by their firms to the industry’s employer 
association and some of them join the association’s bargaining committees in 
the industry-wide wage negotiations, the labor directors from coal mining 
companies do not participate at all in the activities of their employer 
association. This in turn raises the question of whether the impact of the 
1951 law on labor’s bargaining power and wages is greater in iron-steel than 
in coal mining. The particular position of labor directors in the iron and steel 
industry may be an important factor affecting labor’s power. The 1951 law 
in effect gives the (pro-labor) labor directors influence within the employer 
ranks over the industry-wide as well as firm-specific wage negotiations. This 
‘conflict of interest’ is considered so serious by the German Federation of 
Employer Associations that it excludes the Iron and Steel Industry Emp- 
loyer Association from its membership.* 
In general, if more extensive forms of employee participation generate 
greater real gains in labor’s power relative to that of managers and sharehol- 
ders, then one would expect greater income gains for labor the greater the 
extent of employee representation. The next section develops this idea more 
formally. 
2. The conceptual framework 
Analytically, the German codetermination system corresponds to a bila- 
teral monopoly between labor and management where, for expositional 
simplicity, management is taken to represent the interests of shareholders as 
6 See Schregle (1976). Another form of employee participation which exists in all industries is 
the Works Councils. They have legally operated in German companies since 1946 and their 
role was clearly defined by the 1952 and 1972 Works Constitution Acts. While the effects of 
this form of participation strengthen the conclusions of the conceptual model, the quantitative 
effects are not explored in this study. 
‘A 1955 study carried out by the German Metalworkers’ Union indicates that the average 
differential between the actual wage rates and the industry contract rates was 16.4 percent and 
that it was greatest (27.7 percent for males) in iron production. Recently Vollmer (1976) 
reported that plant agreements raise wage rates by as much as 40 percent over the industry-set 
agreements. 
a I am grateful to John Windmuller for pointing out this important aspect of the 1951 law to 
me. 
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well.’ In the bilateral monopoly framework conventional economic analysis 
fails to generate a definite outcome (settlement) between the two parties. 
However, under the as%umption of Pareto efficiency, econoniic models can 
isolate the so called ‘zone of possible settlements’ or ‘contract eve’ within 
which the settlement between two rational partners should OCCUT.‘~ Most 
institutional studies of industrial relations in turn attribute the determination 
of the actual settlement to the relative bargaining power of the two parties.” 
In the present paper an estimating equation is formulated which combines 
the notion of both a contract curve and a settlement which is determined by 
the relative bargaining power of labor and management. Begin by letting the 
firm’s actual profit, calculated net of labor cost, be 
ii=PQ-mM-S-r, (1) 
where P = the product price, Q = the volume of output, m = the managerial 
salary, M = the number of managers, r = the market rate of return on 
capital, K = the amount of capital used by the firm, and 7~~ = other costs (e.g. 
fixed costs). The actual profit net of labor cost, 5, represents the amount 
which the two parties jointly generate and distribute between labor income 
(cost), WL, and the firm’s residual profit 
+=PQ-WL-mM-rK-wo; (2) 
where W = the negotiated wage and L = the number of workers employed 
by the fu-n~‘~ 
In bargaining for the highest possible wage, W, workers are assumed to 
take into account their best alternative (market) wage, w”, which they could 
earn with certainty elsewhere. More realistically, this best alternative wage 
summarizes a distribution of alternative wages that workers face with 
various probabilities in alternative jobs. If rational workers are unwilling to 
settle (stay with the firm) at a wage which is lower than w” (W < Wa), then 
the subject of bargaining between the two parties is given by the ‘net profit’ 
rr=ii-W”L=PQ-W”L-mM-rK-To. (3) 
The net profit, T, represents the residual surplus generated by the firm after 
‘This simplification is quite reasonable given that, with the exception of the ‘neutral’ 
member, the non-employee representatives to the Board of Directors are shareholders. 
Moreover, the model also applies to situations where managers are totally independent of 
shareholders since. all the subsequent analysis can be cast in terms of more than two oarties. See 
Svejnar (19826). 
“Tbe economic notions of the range and boundaries to the bargain were first extensively 
formulated as ‘limits to coercion’ by Commons (1934) and as ‘range of indeterminateness’ by 
Pigou (1938). 
il See for instance. Chamberlain and Kuhn (1951) and Kochan (1980). 
‘2Stri&Iy speaking, W should be taken to represent the total compensation package per 
worker. 
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all inputs have been paid their best alternative (market) prices. The division 
of T between the two parties is presumably determined by their relative 
bargaining power. In order to make this concept operational, let us define a 
measure of labor’s bargaining power as a share y (05 ys 1) of the net profit, 
T. It then follows from eqs. (1) and (3) that the negotiated wage (compensa- 
tion package) equals 
w= W+y(?T/L). (4) 
If y = 0, workers have no bargaining power. They merely obtain the best 
alternative wage (W = W) and the net profit, T, goes entirely to the 
management party. This situation corresponds to a perfectly competitive 
labor market. On the other hand, if y = 1 it follows that W = W” + T/L = 
G/L. This scenario reflects a fully labor-managed firm where workers ap- 
propriate all the net profit. In this case managers and shareholders have no 
bargaining power, 1 -y = 0, and they merely receive the market prices m 
and r for supplying their respective services. 
Eq. (4) lends itself to econometric estimation and the results based on (4) 
are reported in the next section. Before turning to the empirical results, 
however, it is useful to discuss briefly the relationship of the model in eq. (4) 
to some of the relevant game-theoretic literature and to examine the 
appropriateness of this model for analyzing outcomes in the West German 
system. 
In the foregoing discussion, eq. (4) has been posited directly and justified 
in terms of its correspondence to the economic and the institutional indus- 
trial relations literature. However, under appropriate specifications, the same 
equation can be derived as a reduced form from the game-theoretic models 
of Nash (1950, 1952), Kalai (1977) and Svejnar (1982b). Eq. (4) is therefore 
an appealing characterization of bargaining outcomes not only because it is 
in harmony with the existing economic and industrial relations notions, but 
also because it can be derived from a set of presumably broadly acceptable 
axioms. 
In applying the model of eq. (4) to the German codetermination system 
two points ought to be considered. First, since the model incorporates the 
economic principle of Pareto-efficiency, it is incompatible with income losses 
which are under the ‘control of the two parties. The model would therefore 
not be easily applicable in countries such as the United States or Great 
Britain, where strikes and/or lockouts are relatively frequent.13 The German 
system of industrial relations, however, is known for its extreme paucity of 
strikes and lockouts. Moreover, the establishment of codetermination aug- 
mented considerably the information flow between labor and management. 
I3 For examples of models which explicitly incorporate sties, see for instance Ashenfelter 
and Johnson (1969) and Farber (1978). 
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This makes much more realistic the assumption of perfect knowledge, which 
is often invoked as a justificatidn for Pareto-efficient behavior. 
Secondly, since the model treats the case of a bilateral mbnopoly, it is 
worth reiterating that the German system, with its high degree of unioniza- 
tion and industry-level bargaining between the employer associ&ion and a 
given trade union, fits this framework very well. The trade unions are 
organized along industry lines (one union per industry) and are tightly knit 
into a nation-wide confederation representing almost fifty percent of the 
labor force. 
3. The econometric model 
Eq. (4) provides an interesting theoretical restriction, namely that the 
coefficient on W equals unity. For purposes of econometric estimations it is 
also important to realize that if participation raises labor’s power from y to 
y*, then, for a time series covering the periods both before and after the 
advent of participation, eq. (4) becomes 
W = W + r(d-1, + AY(G),Q, (5) 
where Ay = y* - y, D, = 1 after the introduction of participation and D, = 0 
before it.14 
In principle, the coefficients y and Aj can be estimated directly from eq. 
(5). Unfortunately no data exist on net profit, n,, for the periods before and 
immediately after the introduction of participation. As a result, using the 
available data, two different approaches are taken to approximate TV. 
In the first approach it is assumed that TV and (WL), vary proportion- 
ately and hence (m/WaL), is a constant, say k. While the validity of this 
assumption (the constancy of labor’s share in the net profit) cannot be 
ascertained, the approach enables us to answer the important question of 
whether or not the advent of participation has been accompanied by a 
change in relative wages. In particular upon substituting (T/W~L)~ = k into 
(3, the estimating equation becomes 
(W-V’)IW=yk+AykD,, (6) 
01 
W,lWf = 1 + yk + A ykD,. (7) 
14There are two ways to model the maximizing behavior of the codetermined firm. In the 
fust case the hvo parties maximize the joint profit and bargain over its division. In the second 
scenario joint maximizing behavior is not assumed and managers maximize only their residual 
profit, 6. Both approaches generate eqs. (4) and (5). However, for econometric purposes it must 
be noted that in the first case L is exogenous, whereas in the second case it is endogenous. In 
view of the cooperative nature of codetermination, the lirst case is deemed more appropriate 
here. See also Svejnar (1982b). 
J. Svejnar, Employee .participation in management 297 
Eqs. (6) and (7) can be estimated directly and the increase in labor’s 
bargaining power can be calculated from the ratio Ayklyk = A?/?. However, 
the specifications in (6) and (7) do not permit us to test the prediction found 
in eq. (4), namely that the coefficient on w” is equal to unity. At the same 
time the test of this restriction is particularly useful since we are forced to 
approximate m,. Fortunately, since ( W, - W3/ w = ln[ 1 + ( W, - WX W3 = 
In W, -lnv, eq. (6) can be written as 
lnW, =Inw+yk+AykD,+e,, (8) 
where the error term, e,, is assumed to have zero mean and be homoscedastic 
and independent of the explanatory variables. In eq. (8) the theoretical 
restriction of a unitary coefficient on lnw can be tested without imposing it 
on the data directly as in (6) and (7). Moreover, if the restriction is 
empirically supported, the estimate of Ark in (8) should be virtually 
identical with that in (6) or (7). 
The second approach is based on the plausible assumption that the net 
profit varies in proportion to the revenue, PQ = Pa with /3 > 1. .Since 
r = PQ - TC, where the total cost is defined as TC = w”L + mM + rK + mo, 
the assumption PQ = @rr implies that the total cost also varies in proportion 
to the net profit, TC = (/3 - l)~, where /3 - I > 0. Factor costs usually vary 
directly with profit and therefore the bias created by the approximation 
PQ = @rr may not be serious. Since data could be obtained directly for W” 
and L, and in index form for P and Q, the approximation used ,in this second 
approach is given by 
(dW=L), = WQIw"L),, 
where 6 > 0. This specification reflects the logarithmic transformation of (5) 
and hence is directly comparable to (8) in the first approach. 
Needless to say, there are other possible ways to deal with the lack of 
adequate data in the period before and immediately after the introduction of 
participation.” For instance, upon rearranging eq. (5) one obtains 
W, - VLh = Y + A$% 
This expression does not permit a test of the unitary coefficient on W” but it 
does allow a direct estimation of A-y/y upon substitution of (PQ/p), for TV. 
This test was performed and the estimates were found to be similar to the 
second approach estimates which are reported in the next section. Alterna- 
tively, one could try to measure Ay by comparing (W, - W;)L,/q across 
industries in the period since 1951. The advantage of this approach is that 
data are available for most of that period and one would not have to resort 
” I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for bringing these alternative approaches to 
my attention. 
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to approximation. However, the direct inter-industry comparison after 1951 
is only valid if one is willing to assume that, in the absence of parity 
participation, labor’s bargaining power, ?/, is identical in all the industries. 
This is very unlikely since there are numerous industry-specific factors such 
as sex composition, the extent of employment of foreign workers, the 
industry unemployment rate, and the degree of unionization which are likely 
to affect the value of y. Since an adequate specification of all these factors 
could not be achieved, the inter-industry comparison was not undertaken. 
Embedding eq. (4) into a time series framework raises the question as to 
whether the dynamic adjustment of the dependent variable is as instantane- 
ous as suggested by eq. (5). In particular, let 1nWT be the (logarithm of the) 
long-term equilibrium wage given by (5). Then it is possible that in each 
period the adjustment toward this equilibrium is only partial and can be 
characterized by the following process: 
lnW,-lnW,-,=K(lnWT--lnW,-,)+&, (9) 
where K is the partial adjustment coefficient, 05 K 5 1, and /J.~ is an error 
term with the same properties as e, in (8). Combining (5) and (8) and (9) 
yields an estimating equation of the form 
lnW, = K ~~~+~K(~/W”L),+A~K(~/W~L),D,+(~-K)lnW,-,+q, 
(10) 
where E, = CL, + Ke, has the same properties as CL, and e,. In the empirical 
estimation eq. (10) is approximated using the two approaches outlined 
earlier. 
In order to make eqs. (8) and (10) operational, it is also necessary to 
specify the best alternative wage, W. Some of my earlier estimates suggest 
that the 1952 Works constitution Act had no effect on the average hourly 
wage (earnings) in German manufacturing. Moreover, the overall unemploy- 
ment rate has been relatively low in Germany and emphasis in the bargain- 
ing process tends to be placed on inter-industry rather than international 
wage differentials. As a result, it is very likely that for an average miner or a 
steel worker the best alternative wage is either equal or proportional to the 
manufacturing wage, W’” .16 Formally, ( W:/ w) = a: and consequently 
In w  = a’+ In w, where (Y’ = lncx s 0 as CY 3 1. The results reported in the 
following section reflect this specification, with (Y’ and KU’ being estimated as 
components of the constant terms in the respective estimating equations. 
Note that, if a’ #O, it is of course impossible to isolate fully the pure effect of 
codetermination, A+-y, in the tirst approach. 
I6 Since my earlier estimates suggest that the 1952 law had no effect on the hourly earnings in 
German manufacturing, it can be argued that the tests in this paper estimate the effects of the 
Participatory institutions in iron-steel and coal mining as compared to a situation with no 
participation at all. 
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4. Empirical results 
Results in tables 1 and 2 are generated from annual data covering the 
period 1946-1972.” They are based on the two approaches outlined in the 
previous section and estimate the effect of the participatory institutions 
established by the 1951 law in iron-steel and coal mining. The wage data 
used are average hourly earnings of male workers in the respective indus- 
tries. 
Table 1 
Effects of participation on bargaining power and relative wages: 
Estimates based on the hrst approach [(rr/ WY), = constant].’ 
Const. InW’: D, InW,,_, R2 6 
Iron and steel 
1. 0.219 0.878 0.055 0.998 0.76 
(0.050) (0.035) (0.025) (0.13) 
2. 0.211 0.823 0.053 0.060 0.998 0.67 
(0.047) (0.106) (0.028) (0.114) (0.16) 
Coal mining 
3. 0.171 0.893 0.014 0.996 0.76 
(0.076) (0.050) (0.036) (0.13) 
4. 0.437 1.270 -0.034 -0.539 0.998 0.74 
(0.073) (0.119) (0.027) (0.144) (0.14) 
’ Dependent variable = In W, ; values in parentheses are standard 
errors; coefficients are estimated under the assumption of first-order 
autocorrelation in the error terms; 6 is the corrected-for first-order 
autocorrelation coefficient of the residuals’; InW,-, is the predicted 
value of In W,-, estimated by instrumental variables. 
Approximating (T/WI.,), by a constant leads to estimates in table 1. 
Partial and a full adjustment scheme results are presented for each industry. 
In view of the high autocorrelation of the residuals, the equations were 
estimated by generalized least squares. In the partial adjustment schemes 
the predicted value of the lagged dependent variable, In fit-,, was estimated 
by Liviatan’s (1963) instrumental variables method. In spite of the admit- 
tedly rough approximation inherent in the first approach, (n/W’L),= k, the 
results in table 1 provide support for the theoretical model. The constant 
term,’ which in this approach equals cr’+ yk, is positive and significantly 
different from zero in all the schemes. The estimated coefficients of 1nWr: 
“The participation laws of 1972 and 1976 introduce important modifications of the 
codetermination system in Germany. In due tune it will be of interest to investigate the effects 
of these laws as well. 
EER- B 
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Table 2 
Effects of participation on bargaining’ power and relative wages: Estimates based on the second 
approach [(:(n/W’L),-6(PQ/W”L),].” ’ 
Const. Inw (PQ/w”L), U'QW'L),D, fnW,-, R2 ’ h 6 
Iron and steel 
0.31 
1. -0.016 0.969 82.634 7.308 0.999 
(0.054) (0.020) (29.256) (14.349) 
(0.19) 
2. 0.040 0.778 53.985 7.268 0.184 0.999 1.65 
(0.024) (0.141) (16.900) (14.107) (0.149) 
Coal mining 
3. 0.223 0.874 -3.400 2.247 0.996 
0.73 
(0.161) (0.054) (18.527) (5.310) 
(0.!4) 
0.70 
4. 0.295 1.317 24.057 -8.636 -0.583 0.998 
(0.131) (0.135) (15.072) (4.926) (0.171) 
(0.16) 
“Dependent variable =lnW,; values in parentheses are standard errors; h is the Durbin 
(1970) test statistic for autocorrelation when a lagged dependent variable is present; schemes 1, 
3 and 4 are estimated under the assumption of first-order autocorrelation in the error terms; b 
is the corrected-for first-order autocorrelation coefficient of the residuals; in scheme 4 InW,-, is 
the predicted value, InWC,_,, estimated by instrumental variables. 
are fairly close to the theoretically predicted value of 1.0,18 and have very 
low standard errors - a result which suggests that W;” is indeed a good 
candidate for v. The full adjustment model generates a positive 5.5% 
estimate of the wage effect of participation in iron and steel. The corres- 
ponding partial adjustment model produces a 5.3% estimate of this effect. 
In contrast, the estimated wage effect in coal mining is not significantly 
different from zero in either scheme. Hence, the results in table 1 suggest 
that with the introduction of participation wages increased by about 5.3% to 
5.5% in iron and steel but that they remained unchanged in coal mining. 
Assuming that the manufacturing wage is indeed the best alternative 
wage, (Y’ = 0, it is possible to obtain estimates of A$? by dividing in each 
equation the estimated coefficient on D, by the estimated constant term. 
Both the full and partial adjustment schemes suggest that as a result of the 
1951 Codetermination Law labor’s bargaining power increased by 25% in 
iron-steel but remained unchanged in coal mining. 
Since the estimated coefficients on 1nWr: are close to the theoretically 
predicted value of 1.0, the tests were also replicated with the restriction 
‘* In the partial adjustment schemes the coefficient of In WT should be equal to K. When this 
coefficient is divided by K obtained from the coefficient of InW,-,, the resulting value is again 
very close to 1.0. 
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imposed on the data. The resulting estimated effects were virtually identical 
to the unrestricted estimates. 
The results in table 2 reflect the assumption that net profit, q, varies 
proportionally to gross revenue, (PQ)t. The estimate of labor’s pre- 
participation bargaining power is given by the coefficient of (PQ/wBL)t. This 
coefficient is positive and significant in iron and steel, thus suggesting the 
labor’s pre-participation bargaining power had been positive in this industry. 
In contrast, the estimate labor’s pre-participation power is not found to be 
significantly different from zero in coal mining. The coefficients of lnw are 
again close to their theoretically predicted value of 1.0. If Wr: in fact 
constitutes the best alternative wage, WY, then the value of the constant 
term, which in this second approach represents only the deviation of Wn: 
from .Wy (lncu = CY’), ought to be close to zero. As the results in table 2 
indicate, with the exception of scheme 4, it is impossible to reject this 
hypothesis at conventional significance test levels. The estimated effect of 
participation on labor’s bargaining power and wages is positive but statisti- 
cally insignificant in both iron and steel schemes and in the full adjustment 
scheme in coal mining. The partial adjustment model in coal mining gener- 
ates a negative effect which, however, is also not statistically significant from 
zero. 
Since the estimates of the first three schemes in table 2 suggests that (a) 
the coefficient on 1nWr: is not significantly different from its theoretically 
predicted value of 1.0, and (b) the constant term, CX’, is not significantly 
different from zero, the test of the full adjustment scheme was also per- 
formed with these constraints imposed on the model. This specification 
yields virtually identical coefficient estimates of y and Ay as the correspond- 
ing scheme in table 2 and reduces substantially the estimated standard 
errors. While this reduction clearly sharpens our ability to test the 
hypothesis about the bargaining power and wage effects of participation, the 
estimated ratio of Ay to its standard error is still too low to permit the 
conclusion that Ay>O in iron and steel at conventional significance test 
levels. 
5. Conclusions 
In view of the fact that the results in tables 1 and 2 are based, on 
approximations, conclusions should be drawn with caution. The estimates in 
table 1 indicate that the establishment of codetermination was accompanied 
by a wage increase in iron and steel industry but not in coal mining. These 
estimates support my (1981) lindings, which ware obtained within an 
alternative empirical framework. Both studies suggest that the differences 
between the codetermination system established in iron-steel and in coal 
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mining may be significant enough to have varying effects on labor’s bargain- 
ing power in the two industries. However, the results in table 2 indicate that 
the iron and steel wage effect could possibly be due to an-increase in the 
subject of bargaining, T/W”L, rather than to a shift in labor’s bargaining 
power, A?. The results in table 2 also support the earlier finding in table 1 
that A-y = 0 in coal mining. 
If one proceeds with the idea that the shift in the iron and steel wage is 
due to an increase in the subject of bargaining rather than in labor’s 
bargaining power, then the question naturally arises as to whether the 
increase in m/r/waL=G(PQ/WaL) is due to a codetermination-engendered 
rise in productivity or to -an increase in the product price which may or may 
not be related to codetermination. Blumenthal’s (1956) study of the West 
German iron and steel industry supports the latter interpretation. Using 
industry-level data I have recently (1982a) tested the effect of codetermina- 
tion on productivity within a production function framework and could not 
detect any significant effect. Hence if one interprets the findings in the 
present paper as suggesting that the introduction of codetermination had no 
significant effect on labor’s bargaining power, related findings seem to 
indicate that the productivity impact of codetermination was insignificant as 
well. 
While these results are interesting, more empirical research in this area is 
clearly needed. The phenomenon of worker representation on the boards as 
well as of other forms of participation are spreading in most developed 
countries, including the United States and Great Britain. At the same time, 
the theoretical literature on the subject is very limited and empirical 
evidence is virtually non-existent. 
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